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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
A POLICY GAP ANALYSIS OF CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA (CITES) 
IMPLEMENTATION IN NEPAL  
by  
 
Yogesh Dongol 
 
Florida International University, 2011 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Joel T. Heinen, Major Professor 
 
This study attempts to understand how domestic CITES policies are translated 
into action and what effect actions and processes have on compliance. In doing so, this 
study provides insight into the implementation and enforcement pitfalls of national 
legislation that explain CITES violations in Nepal. Primarily, I used key informants 
interviews to learn opinions of experts, and the grounded theory approach for further 
qualitative data analysis. In addition, I used Najman’s (1995) policy implementation 
analysis framework to explain gaps. Many interrelated variables in the content of the 
policy, commitment and capacity of the agencies, the roles of clients and coalitions and 
contextual issues were observed. Variables that emerged suggest pitfalls in the regulatory 
policy represented by low probability of detection, arrest and punishment. Moreover, 
redistributive policies in buffer zones of protected areas are needed into perpetuity to 
benefit locals. Also, conservation organizations’ support for building public and political 
salience is imperative.  
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I. Introduction 
Protection of diverse wildlife and their natural habitats maintains ecosystem stability and 
resilience from disturbance (Loreau et al. 2001; Hooper et al. 2005; Ives et al. 2007).  
Existence of wildlife also provides intrinsic and instrumental values (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 
1992). But human induced threats to wildlife are myriad and include climate change, 
habitat loss and degradation, invasion of exotic species, and overexploitation (McNelly et 
al. 2009; Sutherland et al. 2009; Rands et al. 2010; Butchart et al. 2010).  Moreover, 
increasing human populations and economic growth, and subsequent over-exploitation of 
resources have altered wildlife habitats, and many species have decreased in numbers or 
have gone extinct (Rosser & Mainka 2002). Therefore, conservation efforts that consider 
rare and endangered species protection are essential because such species are inherently 
susceptible to stochastic threats associated with small population sizes (Shaffer 1981).  
 
Unregulated international trade of wildlife and its derivatives is a typical example of over 
exploitation that causes direct threats to species survival. For instance, global trade of 
high value species is massive (Nijman 2009; McNelly et al. 2009); in particular, legal 
wildlife trade in 2005 was reported as $300 billion US (Traffic 2008; Lewis 2009). And 
the international illegal wildlife trade was estimated to be in the tens of billions US $ 
(Wyler and Sheikh 2008). Both have contributed to the extinction of species (Wasser et 
al. 2009).  Generally, wildlife trade includes live animals and plants in the pet and 
horticulture trade, to wildlife meats used for foods, to traditional medicines. For example 
horn, pelts, bones, furs, and other body parts of wild animals such as rhinos (Rhinoceros 
unicornis), tigers (Panthera tigris), elephants (Elephas maximus) and others are traded in 
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international markets. Thus, unregulated legal and more often illegal wildlife trade and 
poaching are consider major threats that affect the survival of many species (McNelly et 
al. 2009; Nijman 2009).  As wildlife trade transcends national borders, trans-boundary 
efforts and coordination to minimize, regulate and control such trade from 
overexploitation are needed (http://www.cites.org). In response, to address long term 
survival of wildlife from international legal and illegal trade, a multilateral environmental 
agreement, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) was developed in 1973 and came into force in 1975.  
 
Multilateral environmental agreements, treaties and conventions are numerous and are 
pivotal to address cross border environmental issues (UNEP 2006).  Such accords 
promote cooperative action between participating nations. In addition, accords foster 
environmentally sustainable behavior through binding or non-binding rules and 
regulations (Jacobson and Weiss 1998; Heinen and Chapagain 2002). Despite 
proliferation of international environmental accords (Faure and Lefevere 1999; UNEP 
2006), national implementation of and compliance with these accords are seen as major 
drawbacks influencing overall effectiveness (Weiss and Jacobson 1998). These 
drawbacks are primarily because policy implementation is inherently a complex political 
process that involves multiple actors operating at multiple levels, each with their specific 
interests, goals and strategies (Najam 1995). Moreover, implementation depends on 
different factors such as social, cultural, political, and economic characteristics of party 
states (Jacobson and Weiss 1998). Given these conditions, possibilities for 
noncompliance are enormous, and as rules without compliance are meaningless, 
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enforcement measures are inevitable (Akella and Canno 2004; Keane et al. 2008). 
Enforcement of domestic legislation on the other hand is complicated because several 
factors play key roles in the implementation of decision making, such as the political 
environment, public opinion, public advocacy (NGOs and INGOs), political will, and 
economic issues in individual nations (Vogel and Kessler 1998; Victor 1998). CITES, a 
multilateral environmental agreement, however, has been considered the most successful 
conservation agreement on legal grounds (Ong 1998), despite voluminous reporting of 
ineffective implementation and compliance to regulate international wildlife trade (Reeve 
2006). In particular, CITES violations in the form of illegal trade (both international and 
domestic) and discrepancies in reported levels of international wildlife trade in individual 
countries are large and growing (Blundell and Mascia 2005; Nijman 2009).   
 
 The CITES agreement primarily aims to control international trade of rare and 
endangered species and to support sustainable trade of listed species.  It is thus both a 
conservation and trade agreement. This agreement includes three categories of protection 
(Appendix I, Appendix II, and Appendix III) that have listed more than 34,000 species of 
wild animals and plants (http://www.cites.org/). The CITES agreement is binding upon 
participating nations and requires individual parties to prepare and implement domestic 
CITES enabling legislation. Usually, wildlife trade is allowed through a permit system 
provided that trade is legal and allowed by CITES provisions. In Nepal, CITES protects 
281 species of wildlife including 44 animals and 2 plants on Appendix I, 122 animals and 
103 plants on Appendix II and 6 animals and 4 plants on Appendix III 
(http://www.cites.org/).  To comply with CITES in Nepal, various but discrete laws are 
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functional (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009). Furthermore, the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), Nepal’s management authority for 
CITES, has begun anti-poaching task forces. Similarly, other management authorities, 
scientific authorities, and enforcement authorities have been established and are 
functional. In addition, several NGOs and epistemic communities and are working in 
biodiversity conservation and some NGOs have begun to explore illegal wildlife trade.  
Despite different efforts to protect and conserve biodiversity, cases of poaching and trade 
that violates CITES are numerous and results are disappointing. In particular, the killing 
of rare and endangered wildlife such as rhino, tiger, snow leopard (Panthera uncia) and 
other wild animals is widespread and growing (Adhakari 2002; Martin 2004; Yonzon 
2005; Baral and Heinen 2006; Bhuju et al. 2009).  An earlier study reported lack of 
implementation and enforcement of existing legislation and absence of domestic CITES 
enabling legislation (Heinen and Chapagain 2002) as a cause of CITES violations in 
Nepal.  But the factors that affect compliance change overtime (Jacobson and Weiss 
1998). More specifically, because the political situation is evolving rapidly as Nepal has 
become a Republic and external markets for products have grown in Southeast and East 
Asia, especially China, the situation is quite fluid. Also widespread poaching and illegal 
trade have been reported within the region (McNelly et al. 2009; Nijman 2009). In 
addition, the open border with China and India, facilitating easy access to transit illegal 
wildlife products, is of major concern (Yonzon 2005; Bhuju et al. 2009). 
 
Given the complexity of policy implementation in general (Najam 1995) and problems of 
CITES implementation in particular (Reeve 2006), my study attempts to understand how 
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domestic CITES policies are translated into action and what affect actions and processes 
have on compliance. In doing so, this study provides insights into the implementation and 
enforcement pitfalls of national legislation that explain CITES violations in Nepal. 
Specifically, this study examines extant government policies through key informant 
interviews and reviews of documents with the consideration of different factors that 
impede CITES implementation. For the study, I used the policy implementation analysis 
framework developed by Najam (1995). Particularly, this study focuses on the content of 
policy, the nature of the institutional context of implementation, the administrative 
capacity of implementers, the commitment of the implementers and the support of clients 
and coalitions of policy implementation.  Rather than focusing on specific testable 
hypotheses, because of the complexity of topic and issues, this study is exploratory and 
generates general knowledge of the problems.  
 
Objectives  
The main purpose of the research is to contribute more knowledge about different factors 
that influence implementation and enforcement of CITES.  My study attempts to describe 
the overall effectiveness of CITES as a conservation and trade tool. Essentially it is a 
policy gap assessment (Heinen 2010) in CITES implementation.  The objectives are: 
 
• To understand the policy content that guides CITES, including administrative 
capacity and the roles and responsibilities of the management and enforcement 
agencies within Nepal.  
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• To assess coordination between CITES implementing agencies within Nepal, and 
with neighboring nations because cooperation is vital to reduce covert activities 
and illegal trade.   
• To understand the role of the contextual environment (political and socio-
economic) that influences policy implementation.   
• To understand the role of the political system, and national and local 
organizations with respect to CITES implementation in Nepal. 
 
Research Questions 
• What are the reasons behind the increase in CITES violations in Nepal?  
• What are the major policy gaps that influence implementation and enforcement of 
CITES in Nepal? 
 
Nature of the Problem: CITES Violation in Nepal  
The CITES violations are enormous and increasing because of social, economic and 
political factors (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Bhuju et al. 2009). For instance, Illegal 
trade and poaching of rare and endangered species such as rhino, tiger, common leopard 
(Panthera pardus), Asiatic black bear (Ursus thibetanus), otter (Lutra lutra; Lutrogale 
perspicillata; Aonyx cinerea), birds and red sandalwood (Pterocarpus Santalinus) is 
widespread in Nepal (Yonzon 2005; Aryal 2009). Three major examples of CITES 
violation are separately discussed below, particularly poaching and illegal trade of rhino, 
tiger and red sandalwood.  
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CITES Violation Case 1: Rhino Poaching and Illegal Trade 
Historically the Indian rhinoceros was found in most of the South Asia, but now its range 
has contracted within Nepal and India with total population of 2575 (Talukdar et al. 
2010). In Nepal, rhinoceros inhabit several southern protected areas bordering India.  
Currently, about 432 rhinos are distributed in three Nepali protected areas (Chitwan 
National Park, Bardia National Park and Suklaphanta Wildlife Reserve).  One horn rhino 
was upgraded to Vulnerable in the IUCN red list in 2008 from Endangered, because of an 
increase in the population in India and Nepal (Milliken et al. 2009). But it is protected 
under Appendix I of CITES because of Chinese rhino horn markets.  Rhino horns are 
particularly traded in China and demand is large and growing. Many people in the region 
believe that the horn has medicinal value.  
 
The rhino population fluctuation for past few decades suggested wide-spread poaching 
and illegal trade in Nepal and within the region.  The population in the 1950s was 800 in 
the Chitwan Valley alone, which decreased to 300 in 1959.  In the late 1960s, rhino 
numbers had decreased to fewer than 100. Gee (1958) in Adhakari (2002) reported that 
about 72 and 60 rhinos were killed in 1954 and 1958 respectively.  About 35 rhinos were 
poached between 1973 and 1991 and a further 28 more were killed in 1992.  But with 
strong external support and functional anti-poaching units, fewer rhinos were killed from 
1992 to 1999. In 1994 anti poaching units arrested 76 poachers which led to an increase 
in the rhino population to 612 in 2000 (Adhakari 2002).  Beginning in 2000, poaching 
increased to such a degree that a total of 372 rhinos in three National Parks were 
estimated in 2005 (Martin and Martin 2006; Bhuju et al. 2009) which was primarily 
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because of lack of security (Oli 2005). During the same period more than 88 rhino 
poachers were arrested, without any reduction of poaching. Poachers killed 108 rhinos 
between 2001 to 2005 (Martin and Martin 2006).   Even though Maoist insurgents came 
into the peace process after 2005, poachers killed 21 rhinos in 2006 taking opportunities 
of the volatile political situation.  The year 2007 was relatively calm as only five rhinos 
were poached. As a result, the rhino surveys in 2008 claimed a total of 444 rhinos in three 
populations in Nepal (Milliken et al. 2009). Since then poachers have killed 36 more 
rhinos (DNPWC 2008; personal communication). Many argued that rhino poaching 
escalated because of socio-political unrest (insurgency) and disruption of law and order 
(Martin 2004; Oli 2005; Milliken et al. 2009). Some reported that livelihoods of local 
people, the geographic location of Nepal and the high commercial value of rhino horn 
(Ming et al. 2000; Yonzon 2005; Talukdar et al. 2010) were all factors in the increase in 
poaching.   
  
CITES Violation Case 2: Tiger Poaching and Illegal Trade 
Five subspecies of tiger inhabit thirteen different countries.  The global population of all 
wild tigers is about 3200 (Chundawat et al. 2010a; Walston et al. 2010) and the Bengal 
tiger that inhabits India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and western Myanmar is about 1,532 
to 2,351 in number (Chundawat et al. 2010b). Tigers in Nepal are spread in three 
different populations in lowland protected areas. The 2008 tiger count estimated 241-304 
tigers, which was a decrease from 360-370 total estimated in 2005. In the year 
1999/2000, the total estimated tiger number was 340-350 (DNPWC 2007).  Although 
tiger are listed as Endangered in the IUCN red list, protected under Appendix I of CITES, 
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and protected by the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act in Nepal, illegal 
trade is prevalent. 
 
Primarily, tiger skins and bones are traded for medicine, clothing and decorations in 
Southeast and East Asia, especially in China. Earlier studies reported that tiger poaching 
from Nepal’s protected areas is relatively low compare to the number of tiger products 
seized. This threatens tiger conservation in the wild because of Nepal’s role as a transit 
for illegal wildlife trade and poaching in India for markets in China (Yonzon 2005). From 
2004 to 2007, 26 persons were arrested on charges of tiger poaching with 25-29 tiger 
skins and 128.5 kg of bones confiscated (DNPWC 2007; Damania et al. 2008).  Further, 
DNPWC has reported 19 more poachers were arrested from 7 different cities of Nepal. 
The majority of arrests were from Kathmandu, Chitwan (Central Nepal), Bardiya and 
Kanchanpur (Far-western Nepal). Total tiger bones confiscated from poachers and traders 
from 2004 to 2009 amounts to 167 kg (personal communication).  
 
CITES Violation Case 3: Red Sandalwood Trade 
Red sandalwood (Pterocarpus santalinus) is an aromatic tropical hardwood tree which is 
endemic to the southern part of India (http://www.iucnredlist.org, Zhou 2004). This 
species do not naturally occur in Nepal. Instead, Nepal is a main trade route for the 
species from India to China.  This species is listed under the Appendix II of the CITES. 
Because of its aromatic, favorable coloration and high density wood, this species has 
been among the most priced wood for furniture since the Ming dynasty (1368—
1644AD), and was reserved for Imperial use only during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) 
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due to its rarity. Demand for the species remain high in modern China, and has been 
increasing since the economic boom started three decades ago.   It also is used, to a lesser 
degree, as medicine. The high economic value has encouraged illegal trade on this 
species.  
 
Illegal trade of red sandalwood provides a unique example of CITES violation in Nepal 
and in the region.  Nepal, India and China are all party to CITES and are required to 
comply with its provision. The CITES provisions necessitate each participating country 
to have CITES export, re-export and import permits.  Until 2063 BS (2006/2007), District 
Forest Offices in Kathmandu and Lalitpur had provided route permission to transport red 
sandalwood, and a study reported that 500-600 tons were traded (Mandal et al. 2008). 
The Kathmandu District Forest Office alone provided transportation permits for about 
450 tons of red sandalwood within 15 months (July 2004 to October 2005). The Nepal 
Army for the first time seized 7.8 tons of sandalwood in February 2006. District forest 
records showed that 256 tons of red sandalwood have been seized from 15 different 
places of the country since then. Of which unclaimed red sandalwood is about 62.5 tons, 
and claimed is 193.3 tons.  Theft from court premises was about 19 tons.  Also 29 tons 
were repatriated to India.  The remaining total after loss, theft and repatriation was about 
208 tons.  A total of 55 cases of illegal trade in red sandalwood has been documented by 
DFOs.  In the latest reported case, traders tried to transport 32 kg of wood in August 
2009. The data mentioned that people were illegally exchanging 8.081 tons of confiscated 
red sandalwood with utis (Alnus nepalensis). Further, organized gangs took away 11.24 
tons of red sandalwood from Lalitpur District Forest Office on November 2007.   More 
11 
 
importantly, the UNEP-WCMC database documented legal trade of red sandalwood from 
Nepal to China is about 68 tons (http://www.unep-wcmc.org/citestrade/trade.cfm, April 
4, 2011). 
 
Overview of CITES Implementing Policies  
In order to implement and comply with CITES, Nepal has adopted different legislative 
provisions. Although Nepal does not have specific CITES enabling legislation, existing 
laws prohibit any illegal taking, killing and trading of wildlife species.  Some relevant 
laws that guide CITES implementation are: The National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation Act, 1973, The Forest Act, 1993, The Export Import (Control) Act 1961, 
The Customs Act, 2007, The Police Act, 1995 and The Environmental Protection Act 
1997.  Regulations of all these acts are functional. Different plans and programs 
developed to curb illegal wildlife trade and poaching, and to promote conservation are:  
The Wildlife and Plants International Trade Control Act, 2010; the National Conservation 
Strategy for Nepal, 1988; the Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan, 1993; the 
Revised Forestry Sector Policy, 2000; the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy (NBS) and its 
Implementation Plan, 2002.  The Species Action Plan for Greater One-horned Rhinoceros 
Conservation (2006-2011), the Tiger Conservation Action Plan (2007-2012); the South 
Asian Wildlife Enforcement Network (SA-WEN), 2007; and the Memorandum of 
Understanding with China and India have been signed to control trans-boundary illegal 
wildlife trade (Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009).   
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The Wildlife and Plants International Trade Control and Regulation Act, 2010 
Domestic CITES enabling legislation called “The Rare (Endangered) Wildlife and Plants 
Trade Control Act, 2057 “was drafted in 2002.  Heinen and Chapagain (2002) claim that 
the 2002 draft CITES bill was robust enough to address many CITES violations. But the 
political instability following the Maoist insurgency and the lack of political priority 
largely withheld the CITES bill for a decade.  However in May 2010, a new CITES bill 
was approved by the Nepali Cabinet which further needs endorsement from parliament to 
come into law. Surprisingly, the provisions in the current draft CITES bill are quite 
different then the bill drafted in 2002 (which never came into force).  
Article 3 prohibits trade of endangered (CITES appendix I) species. Sub-section 2 of 
Article 3 allows any person or organization to farm or reproduce endangered animals and 
plants.  Sub-section 3 allows trading of F-1 and subsequent generations of animals and 
plants after getting permission from the management authority.  Article 6 and 7 discuss 
permission requirements from the management authority for transportation of CITES 
Appendix II and Appendix III species respectively, for education, scientific and/or 
business purpose.  Articles 11 and 12 have punishments provision. Punishment for 
infractions involving protected animals include 3 - 7 yrs imprisonment and 500,000- 
1000,000 NRs (approx. $ 7,000 -14,000 US) and, in case of illegal trade of endangered 
plants, punishment is 1 - 3 yrs imprisonment and 100,000-500,000 NRs (approx.$ 1,390 -
6,950 US).  Punishments for infractions involving transportation of endangered animals 
and plants against the law range from 1 to 3 yrs imprisonment and/or 100,000-500,000 
NRs (approx. $ 1400 -7,000 US), to 6 months to 3 yrs imprisonment and 10,000 to 
50,000 NRs (approx. $ 140 -700 US).  Fines and jail term for involvement in trading 
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Appendix II and III animals and plants range from 3 months to 1 year and 10,000 to 
50,000 NRs (approx. $ 140 -700 US).  Fines and jail terms for accomplices is half of that 
for offenders. Article 25 spells out the responsibilities of the CITES Coordination 
Committee which involves high ranking officers from different government agencies, but 
without representation from the army. Representative from NGOs have also not been 
included in the committee. Trust fund and reward provisions are included in Article 26 
and 27 respectively.  And Article 30 spells out the continuation of the 1973 National 
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and 1993 Forest Act.  
 
The National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1973 (GoN 1973) 
The goals of this act are to protect and manage wildlife and habitats throughout Nepal. 
The Government or a concerned agency can declare any area as a national park, wildlife 
reserve or conservation area and also may establish buffer zones outside such areas if 
necessary.  This act prohibits entry inside national parks and wildlife reserves without 
permission from an authorized officer. Activities such as hunting, residing, collection of 
any product, harming and taking weapons, poisons are prohibited inside National Parks 
and Wildlife Reserves.  Protected animals (Appendix 1) under this act cannot be hunted 
and hunting requires permits for other species.  Permission is also required to collect any 
specimen for scientific purposes. The law also prohibits trade in trophies without license. 
Export and import of wildlife products require permits from the Ministry of Forests and 
Soil Conservation. This act provides authority to National park officers to inspect and 
search with or without warrant any person in suspicion of violation and allows for 
rewards of up to 50,000 NRs (approx. $ 700 US) to any person who furnishes 
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information that leads to the arrest of a poacher, or one who has killed or injured 
rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, musk deer (Moschus chrysogaster), clouded leopard (Neofelis 
nebulosa), snow leopard, and gaur (Bos gaurus). Any person who illegally kills or 
injures, sells, purchases or transfers or obtains rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, musk deer, 
clouded leopard, snow leopard or gaur, or keeps, purchases or sells rhinoceros horn or 
musk-pods or fur of snow leopards as well as trophies of any other protected wildlife, 
shall be punished with a fine ranging from fifty to one hundred thousand NRs (approx. $ 
700 US to $ 1400 US) and/or imprisonment ranging from five years to fifteen years. 
Detailed punishments are listed in the Act in case of harm to other animals.  All 
investigations of offenses under this Act are conducted by a National Park Officer 
(Ranger or Subedar or Non-Gazette Class First) or by an employee at least with the rank 
of sub-inspector in the Police force.  The Warden has the authority to hear and dispose of 
cases under this Act. An appeal may be filed before the Appellate Court against any 
decision within 35 days. 
  
The Forest Act, 1993 and the Forest Regulation, 1995 (GoN 1995)   
The goals of this act and its regulations are to conserve and manage forests and their 
resources. This act manages all forest categories within Nepal, which are:  national 
forests, government managed forests, protected forests, community forest, leasehold 
forests, religious forests and private forests.  The 1993 Forest Act provides jurisdiction of 
forest officers to implement wildlife laws outside of national parks, reserves and 
conservation areas. The Act prohibits activities such as the collection, removal, 
utilization, distribution and export of many important listed plants for the protection of 
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biodiversity (Appendix 2). The District Forest Officer (DFO) is the adjudicating authority 
who shall hear and dispose cases up to NRs 10,000 (approx. $ 140 US), whereas the 
district court has the authority to oversee cases greater than NRs 10,000 (approx. $ 140 
US) with regard to forest products violations. Offenders are punished with fines 
equivalent to the product amount and/or imprisonment up to five years. The DFO is 
responsible for investigating poaching and sales of wildlife products and penalize 
offenders that fall within its jurisdiction. Rule 13 provides a regulatory mechanism to 
export, import and re-export various forest products. Traders, with applications in District 
Forest Offices, and subsequent permission (and recommendation to concerned custom 
officers) from forest officers, can export any forest product under the regulations.  
 
The Customs Act, 2007 (GoN 2007) 
Provisions in the Customs Act, 2007 and Customs Rules, 2007 require submitting a 
declaration of goods to be imported and exported. Any export or import of goods requires 
permit of transport from a custom office.  In case of sending goods from one part of a 
foreign country to another part of that foreign country through Nepalese territory, the 
owner of goods shall submit an application. Also, a recommendation letter from the 
concerned embassy or diplomatic office is required before granting permission, followed 
by a declaration of goods and permit of transport.  Export smuggling or import smuggling 
is considered if traded goods are different or inconsistent as declared, if the trader failed 
to submit a declaration or evidence of any goods which are subject to customs duty and if 
the trader uses other than the specified route of transport. Such failure to comply with the 
Act is subjected to punishment including jail terms and/or fines depending on the 
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quantity of traded goods.  This Act provides power to customs employees to examine all 
exported and imported goods, to search persons or vehicles and to confiscate goods for 
laboratory examination. Customs employees are also provided the power to arrest, detain 
and release on bail anyone found to have committed any offense under the Act. Customs 
employees can exercise the same powers as courts for the purposes of this Act.  
 
The Export and Import (Control) Act 1961 (GoN 1961) 
The goal of this act is to prohibit or control export and import of goods, and to meet 
several objectives including protection of animals and plants, natural resources, and 
implementation of multilateral environmental conventions or bilateral agreements among 
others. This act provides the power to prohibit or control exports and imports and to 
frame rules to meet objectives.  Punishment provisions under section 5 are for those who 
trade prohibited or restricted goods and include fines equal to the value of the goods 
and/or imprisonment not exceeding one year.  Any person fabricating licenses or 
providing false information to obtain a license may be punished with a fine not exceeding 
two thousand rupees (approx. $ 28 US). This Act also has a provision to reward any 
person giving information pertaining to exported or imported goods in contravention.  
 
The Environmental Protection Act 1997 (GoN 1997) 
The goal of this act is to protect and conserve the environment and natural resources. The 
Government of Nepal may maintain any natural heritage, rare wildlife, or biological 
diversity deemed important for environmental protection in designated areas.  Activities 
such as sales, hunting, or harming wildlife are prohibited within such areas. No one is 
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allowed to research, collect or take any samples of any animal or plant without formal 
application and subsequent permission from the concerned agency.  
 
Multiple Actors of Policy Implementation 
Different agencies play critical roles implementing and enforcing domestic CITES policy 
in Nepal. Arguably, the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder are on an ad hoc 
basis. Political parties and leaders particularly have a role in assisting conservation and 
management decisions based on extant government rules and regulations. To comply 
with CITES, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation is designated 
as the management authority for fauna and the Department of Forests is the management 
authority for flora. The 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and its 
regulations and the 1993 Forest Act and its regulations have provided roles, 
responsibilities and jurisdictions of each agency. In particular, the Warden and DFO are 
quasi-judicial bodies where they are required to investigate and give verdicts on 
violations. According to CITES, the management agency has the role to issue CITES 
permits and certificates. Also, management agencies manage programs and activities, and 
conduct regular meeting to achieve goals. The Department of Plant Resource is the 
scientific authority for flora in Nepal. Similarly, Nepal’s Natural History Museum is the 
scientific authority for fauna. Essentially, scientific authorities have a role to identify 
species and products thereof if required. Scientific authorities also update the status of 
plants and animals. In particular, they are required to report on the status of species based 
on scientific information if sought by a management authority. To enforce the 1973 
National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act, the Army forms the largest security force 
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in and around national parks and wildlife reserves. Their primary responsibility is to 
safeguard wildlife and habitats inside protected areas. About 6,778 army personnel are 
involved in the protection of 9,767 sq. km of 12 protected areas 
(http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/env-con.php). In Chitwan National Park alone, more than 
900 army are employed.  Around 350-525 army personnel reside in 35 different posts 
scattered around the park. According to law, they have power to arrest anyone if found 
inside National Parks without permission and shoot if offenders try to escape. Similarly, 
the 1995 Police Act delegates police the power to curb illegal activities within the 
country. Furthermore, the Appellate Court and Supreme Court investigate and give 
verdicts in cases where anyone is not satisfied with the judgment of the Warden and 
District Forest Officer. Custom Officers primarily investigate and search products that are 
intended for export, import or re-export/import. Collaborating agencies such as 
international and national non-governmental organizations facilitate and support 
government agencies to achieve desired goals. They initiate programs and activities for 
protection and conservation of wildlife and also help promote participation of different 
stakeholders.  Furthermore, local people and local organizations, user groups and 
committees are other grass root stakeholders that affect policy implementation or are 
affected by policy.  
 
II. Methodology 
Study Area  
My study was conducted in Nepal with the focus on analysis of domestic policy 
implementation with respect to primary CITES goals and objectives. Nepal is 
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economically a least developed country (http://www.worldbank.org.np) and the majority 
of conservation funding depends on donor support (Heinen and Chapagian 2002).  The 
recent decade long civil war and political transition from a monarchy to a democratic 
republic (post civil war phase) have greatly diminished social and economic progress.  
The current political situation has impacted all sectors including environmental and 
wildlife conservation efforts and processes (Oli 2005, Baral and Heinen 2006).  
Geographically, Nepal shares an open border with India in the South, East and West, and 
a more restricted but largely un-policed border with China in the North.  Nepal is 147 
181sq km in area and has 20 protected areas covering 23.23 % (including buffer zones) of 
the total land area (http://www.dnpwc.gov.np/protected-areas.asp). Nepal became party 
of CITES in 1975. Nepal has embraced protection of species and habitats in different 
IUCN categories of protected areas (national parks, conservation areas, wildlife reserves, 
etc.). Current conservation practices in Nepal are a mixture of both top down and bottom 
up approaches. In many protected areas, national army and park staff are deployed for 
strict protection of species and habitats inside core areas, where as local people and 
conservation organizations are involved in conservation and management of buffer zones 
outside protected areas, and of several large conservation areas in the northern part of the 
country.  Several conservation policies and mechanisms are also in place to protect 
wildlife inside and outside of protected areas (Aryal 2009).  
 
Methods 
On the basis of Bernard’s (2006) qualitative research method, I used face-to-face 
interviews with key informants representing government agencies, non-governmental 
20 
 
organizations, journalists and local people. Open ended semi structured questionnaires 
were used for interviews.  In addition, I reviewed wildlife policies and enforcement 
records. I used the purposive sampling method for key respondent selection as it is 
flexible in allowing the inclusion of new respondents with the progress of interviews and 
with information gained from previous interviews (Bernard 2006). Essentially, key 
informant interviews are appropriate and effective when intricate problems need to be 
unraveled, and when in-depth information cannot be expected from representative survey 
respondents (Tremblay 1957). Kumar et al. (1989) claim that the method is useful to 
acquire descriptive information for further quantitative study and to give suggestions and 
recommendations. In addition, Bradburn et al. (2004) suggest that the method is 
particularly beneficial when information cannot be obtained accurately and economically 
by any other procedure. 
 
Key Informants Selection 
The selection process began with an identification of different management and 
collaboration agencies involved in CITES implementation and enforcement in Nepal. 
Agencies selected were; the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation, the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(Nepal Police), the Ministry of Finance (Department of Customs), as well as international 
NGOs such as International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), 
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and World Wildlife Federation (WWF-Nepal) 
and national NGOs such as the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC),  
Wildlife Conservation Nepal (WCN) and the Nepal Forum for Environmental Journalism 
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(NEFEJ).  As adequate consideration of education, knowledge, responsible position and 
roles of the respondents is important in selecting key informants for interview (Kumar et 
al. 1989), I took suggestions and advice for selection of key informants from highly 
reputed wildlife conservation personnel in Nepal (Resources Himalaya Foundation and 
WWF-Nepal). In addition, I got inputs from my advisor for key informant selection as he 
is highly acquainted with wildlife conservation, and as he completed similar work in 
Nepal previously (e.g. Heinen et al. 1995; Heinen and Chapagain 2002). Following the 
selection process, key informants in government agencies (management, scientific and 
enforcement agencies) and collaborating agencies and institutions (national 
organizations, community organizations, and experts in the field) were contacted via 
telephone and email.  
 
Key informants 
Sixteen key respondents were interviewed from the above listed agencies and 
organizations; Government authority (50%, n=8), experts (12.5%, n=2), organizations 
(18.75%, n=3), reporters (12.5%, n=2) and locals (6.25%, n=1). Although multiple key 
respondents from each agency could strengthen the results, this study included less than 
the expected number of respondents because some respondents were reluctant to 
communicate on the topic and some had too little a role or were not closely related to the 
issue. Particularly, some respondents from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Nepal Police), 
and the Ministry of Finance (Department of Customs) showed an unwillingness to 
communicate despite several efforts.  I interviewed the army head of Chitwan National 
Park about the issues and problems because of their role in wildlife protection and 
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curbing illegal activities inside national parks.  A respondent from IUCN-Nepal was 
intentionally avoided after office visits because that organization does not have employee 
expert on CITES implementation.  Although ICIMOD has large interest in and 
contribution to biodiversity conservation in Nepal, I did not take consideration of 
ICIMOD for interviews because their current role in CITES implementation and 
compliance is negligible. Instead, highly acclaimed environmental reporters from two 
national dailies (The Himalayan Times and Kantipur Daily) were interviewed because 
they have been reporting on wildlife trade issues for the last 10 years.  Also I interviewed 
the buffer zone president from Jagatpur, Kashara (Chitwan National Park), because local 
people’s views on the enforcement of wildlife laws at ground level are important for 
protection of wildlife in and around national parks.  
 
Key informants interview 
Before any interview, I began with an introduction and background, and research 
objectives. I assured respondents about anonymity and confidentiality of responses. 
Following that, key resource persons were asked to give their views on the broad topic of 
wildlife conservation and their role in biodiversity conservation in Nepal. The question 
was aimed at getting an idea about their priorities for conservation. Further, respondents 
were asked about the existing political and economic environment of the country with 
respect to CITES implementation. Later questions were more specific, especially on 
pitfalls of existing CITES policy, and on prevailing wildlife trade and growing CITES 
violations. Questions about current functions of government and collaborating agencies 
and the role of organized crime were also asked. As an inability to recall issues or a 
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tendency to digress from the main point is frequent in key informant interview, and this 
was prevalent during my research, respondents were occasionally reminded about major 
themes to get the interview back on track. As recording interviews is important for later 
analysis, I asked permission to record interviews on audiocassettes; 12 respondents gave 
permission.  
 
Document Reviews 
To understand obstacles and loopholes in wildlife protection from illegal and legal 
international trade, and to suggest effective implementation and compliance, I reviewed 
national policies and initiatives. My review was particularly focuses on the National 
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973, the Forest Act 1993, the Custom Act 2007 
The Export and Import (Control) Act 1961, and the Environmental Protection Act, 1997. 
Also annual reports published by the DNPWC, the United Nations Environment 
Program-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) database from CITES 
websites, and media coverage of wildlife trade issues were reviewed. In addition, I 
gathered poachers’ data obtained from district courts (from Chitwan National Park office) 
to understand enforcement issues. More specifically, the UNEP-WCMC database was 
used to detect probable discrepancies in reported legal trade.  Media coverage of illegal 
wildlife trades was also reviewed from 2007 to 2010, particularly focusing on the EGH 
(Environmental Graduates in Himalaya) weekly publication from three national dailies 
(The Kantipur Daily, The Himalayan Times, Gorkhapatra Daily).  Poaching data were 
mainly focused on rhino, tiger, and red sandalwood because parts of these animals and 
plants are highly traded in international markets. Although illegal trade of other species 
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such as Asiatic black bear, common leopard, musk deer, otter, orchids (many species), 
and yarshagumba (Cordyceps sinensis) have been reported (Aryal 2009), I did not take 
these into consideration for my study.  
 
Analysis 
All interviews were conducted in Nepali and were transcribed into English for further 
coding and analysis. I used the grounded theory approach for qualitative data analysis 
developed by Glaser and Strauss, 1976 in (Bernard 2006). On the basis of this approach, 
a list of information and comments emerged in an interviews were carefully analyzed 
sentence by sentences to discover subthemes. Primarily, I considered repetition of words 
and ideas, transitions, similarities and differences in each preceding and following 
sentence, and theory related materials to discover subthemes (Ryan and Bernard 2003). I 
used Ethnography version 6 qualitative data analysis software for coding qualitative 
information to facilitate analysis. Each meaningful sentence was coded to generate 
subthemes. Furthermore, I used Najam’s (1995) model of 5Cs protocol of policy 
implementation conceptual framework for further categorization and analysis of inter-
relation of different variables (subthemes) obtained from ethnographic software. The five 
Cs represent clusters of variables of policy implementation which were developed based 
on the meta-analysis (literature review) of policy formulation and implementation 
research. These Cs stands for content of the policy, the nature of the institutional context, 
commitment of multiple policy implementing agents, capacity of implementing agents, 
and support of clients/coalitions. Najam’s model helps to explain and gives insight about 
potential sources of policy implementation gaps. Categories of themes provide broad 
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(Endangered) Wildlife and Plants Trade Control Act, 2057 (2002)” was drafted in 2002, 
but has been held up in the Cabinet since then.  The majority of key respondents 
mentioned that extant laws, especially the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Act and the 1993 Forest Act, lack specific roles and responsibilities of CITES 
implementing agencies. Some respondents claimed that a clear chain of command is 
needed in law to regulate the roles of army and police.  In addition, almost 60% stated 
that punishment provisions (NRs. 50,000 to 100,000 (approx. $ 700 US to $ 1400 US) 
and/or 5-15 years imprisonment) in the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Act have drawbacks. They argued that such open provisions have provided adequate 
space for personal discretion and engendered inconsistency in judgment. Respondents 
stated that the penalty is unjust and lopsided; most convicted and prosecuted front line 
poachers are poor and middle men are rarely caught.  In fact, some believe that 
punishment through existing legislation is negligible. They claimed that the lower risk of 
punishment has encouraged people to get involved in poaching and illegal wildlife trade. 
Furthermore, they mentioned that a fixed penalty needs to be reviewed because the 1973 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act consider notorious poachers and traders as 
equal to first time offenders. For example, an infamous illegal wildlife trader “Yakche” 
confessed that he was involved in more than 20 rhino horns traded, but he just got 5 years 
imprisonment and fines. Some also cited that the legislation lacks a performance 
appraisal system. In particular, they believed that rewards, incentives, and punishment 
with respect to wildlife conservation are essential to reduce the current discrepancy in 
judgments.  Moreover, a few resource personnel suggested that update of species on the 
protected list, clarity in definition, and adequate time provisions for investigation are 
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needed to solve some of the basic problems in implementing the Act.  In particular, they 
mentioned the urgent need to include clouded leopard on the protected list because of 
high rate of killing for illegal trade.  
 
Respondent- Expert: “The Army does not listen to the management agency, which is why 
the chain of command should be clear and inscribed in law”. 
 
Respondent- Government officer: “Stringency of punishment varies according to judges 
because of the open provision in existing law. The open law has provided opportunity for 
corruption and personal discretion primarily to favor high profile illegal traders and 
poachers”. 
 
Figure 2: Frequency and number of the top five content issues. 
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The Administrative Capacity of the Implementers 
One of the highly prioritized pitfalls is the lack of resources in implementing agencies. 
Almost 75% of respondents claimed that limited staff in management and enforcement is 
a deterrent to implementation. Furthermore, nearly 50 % said that funding is too little to 
carry out administrative and enforcement activities. All respondents believed that 
agencies lack capacity to implement and enforce legislation, and to curb poaching and 
illegal wildlife trade.  Almost 90% cited that the DNPWC and the DOF lack 
administrative and management capacity and also lack knowledge.  In particular, half of 
the respondents claimed that national park wardens and the district forest officers do not 
have sufficient legal knowledge or background to prosecute offenders in favor of wildlife 
protection. In addition, some mentioned that management agencies are highly dependent 
on NGOs and lack leadership.  The Department of Forests especially lacks leadership in 
implementing CITES.  Almost half of the respondents were aware of the non functional 
role of scientific authorities.  They claimed that the diminished role might be because of 
lack of funding, under staffing and lack of knowledge. Some inferred that lack of 
resources constrains scientific authorities from updating, listing and researching wild 
animals and plants.  In addition some resource persons claimed that field level police and 
customs staff lack awareness and knowledge about the importance of wildlife and cannot 
identify wildlife products. In response many suggested adequate training and 
sensitization programs are necessary each year, or that such programs should be the part 
of their curriculum.  Almost 40 % believed that inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the 
Army might be because of a lack of incentive to perform better. Some also said that lack 
of incentive in other security staff including army, police and national park staff might 
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have discouraged patrolling. Although the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation Act has reward provisions, respondents said that none of the staff to date 
has received a reward. Some respondents mentioned that the enforcement of law is 
difficult because the DNPWC and DoF have no role in incentivizing army and police for 
their work.   
 
Figure 3: Frequency and number of the top five administrative capacity issues. 
 
 
The Commitment of the Implementers  
The third prioritized variable was the lack of commitment to protect wildlife from 
poaching and illegal trade.   The majority of respondents mentioned that the army should 
be accountable.  They specifically stated that the army needs to take responsibility of 
rhino poaching inside national parks. Furthermore, some claimed that the army showed 
indifference even when rhino were killed 100 m from their post, and they usually do not 
follow management authority directives.  Field level staff shirk patrolling when no one is 
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there to monitor their activities. Almost 2/3 of the respondents also claimed that the 
enforcement personnel including Army, Police and Judges have never considered wildlife 
crime as serious, and such crime has never been their priority. In response, they 
suggested that an enforcement network and clear chain of command are needed. Many 
argued that enforcement personnel, particularly wardens, DFOs and appellate court 
judges, lack professional ethics or good moral behavior because their decisions are 
inconsistent and biased toward high profile wildlife poachers and traders. The biased 
punishment has encouraged killing and trading because of low risk of punishment in all 
other cases. All respondents expressed that corruption in judicial agencies is the primary 
factor that impedes effective implementation of the legislation. They mentioned that 
major implementers involved in corruption are Wardens, DFOs and Judges of Appellate 
and Supreme Courts. Likewise, some claimed that district forest officers, police and army 
showed an unwillingness to curb illegal red sandalwood trade primarily because of 
corruption, political influence and lack of professional ethics. The police, army and 
custom officers were heavily involved in abetting red sandalwood trade. Furthermore, 
many claimed that the political will and priority to protect and conserve wildlife is 
negligible.  The most obvious example of low political will is the decade old draft CITES 
implementation bill still in bureaucratic processes. Some also cited that some agencies 
shirk their responsibilities completely in this area and lack ownership of the issue.  
One of the overriding drawbacks that prompts poaching and illegal trade according to all 
respondents is the lack of security measures in and around national parks. The army is 
primarily responsible to protect wildlife inside national parks and wildlife reserves.  The 
majority of resource personnel claimed that the army do not adequately patrol potential 
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poaching areas.  Some argued that the numbers of guard posts are inadequate and the 
number of security personal in each post is too little for patrol. Some commented that 
foot patrol is important and in reality it is very minimal.  Some respondents cited that 
anyone can enter national parks without any deterrent (easy access) mainly because of 
lack of security. Further, respondents claimed that there are few instances in which the 
army has ever caught poachers inside national parks, instead they mentioned that both 
army and police personnel have been caught poaching.  Several reported that lack of 
ownership of the problem and lack of resources might be one of the reasons for rise in 
poaching..       
 
Respondent - Expert: “The current rate of poaching is because of lower security 
measures and lack of responsibility in enforcement, particularly in the army which 
suggests that we should look for alternative security measures” 
 
Respondent- government officer: “If Wildlife Conservation Nepal can get 
information and arrest illegal traders with the help of few police and ex-police personnel, 
why hasn’t the whole police administration had success, I think it is largely because of 
lack of priority and commitment”. 
 
Respondent- government officer: “Despite 70% of the total wildlife budget going 
to army, we have not seen any responsibility, accountability and seriousness in the army, 
which is very frustrating” 
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Figure 4: Frequency and number of the top five Commitment issues 
 
 
Almost all respondents opined that lack of coordination, communication and cooperation 
between agencies are main reasons that have hindered CITES implementation in Nepal.  
The lack of concerted effort was the third most important among all prioritized 
implementation gaps.  Meetings between and within agencies (scientific, enforcement 
and collaborating agencies) are rare.  Respondents including the army chief also 
mentioned that they do not share information and intelligence because they do not trust 
other agencies.  Information and knowledge sharing between DNPWC and enforcement 
agencies such as army, police and custom is virtually negligible. Many mentioned that 
custom officers do not participate in meetings.  Moreover communication between 
stakeholders including NGOs and locals is minimum. In addition, many said that current 
trans-boundary meetings are infrequent. Although there are meetings, seminars and 
understanding of the need for information sharing and a joint task force to implement and 
enforce rules to curb illegal trade exists, continuity is lacking.   
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The support of Clients and Coalitions  
Some respondents claimed that the role of NGOs is ineffective.  Particularly, they 
mentioned that NGOs are primarily money making institutions, and they focus on 
meetings and seminars with little benefits for wildlife protection from international trade. 
Additionally, about 30% were concerned about Wildlife Conservation Nepal’s (WNC; a 
national conservation NGO) role as an enforcement agency without transparency or 
information sharing, and against national law.  A few also claimed that NGOs seriously 
lack field knowledge and do not have long term visions about protecting wildlife from 
illegal trade and poaching. Some also mentioned that NGOs and government agencies 
were unable to make conservation a priority in the political domain.   
 
Figure 5: Frequency and number of the top five Clients and Coalition issues 
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and development have not adequately addressed the key stakeholders’ needs and 
aspirations.  The respondents opined that benefits from incentive based conservation are 
lopsided to a few particular groups, leaders and/or communities.  A majority mentioned 
that the lack of coalition between locals and street level bureaucrats especially has 
hindered the implementation processes. In particular, respondents mentioned that the key 
stakeholders lack opportunity or capacity, which has reduced participation and 
subsequently reduced trust between implementers and locals.  Although many buffer 
zone committees and users groups were formed to encourage participation and to build 
favorable relationships between implementers and target groups, some claimed that social 
capital, and especially the relationship between locals, army and park staff, is 
deteriorating. For instance, the news media and some respondents mentioned that army 
killed 3 local suspected of poaching in Bardiya National Park on March 2010. Following 
the incident, local people, national media, and national and international human rights 
organizations protested the crime as a serious human rights violation by the army. 
Respondents said that the current conservation approach still is top down, which is highly 
regulatory and frequently disregards locals. In particular, a few respondents mentioned 
that the current system lacks participatory CITES implementing units. They emphasized 
that all actors such as local leaders, user groups and community based organizations 
(CBOs) should be included in the design and implementation of policy. Some expressed 
that strong participatory networks should be built between locals, users group, user 
committees and CBOs against poaching and illegal trade.  A few also emphasized that the 
contribution of epistemic communities is very rare in providing the needed guidance and 
in generating resources to curb illegal wildlife trade. However many considered  the 
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recent meeting of the South Asian Experts Group on Illegal Wildlife Trade to support 
South Asian Wildlife Enforcement Network (SA-WEN) as a  positive effort. Besides, 
some respondents cited that print and broadcast media have played major roles in 
enhancing the importance of wildlife conservation and also highlighting issues 
concerning illegal activities by politicians, army, police, customs and judges.  In 
particular, some praised the media’s role in reducing red sandalwood trade and bringing 
attention to rhino poaching.  
 
The Nature of the Institutional Context  
Most respondents agreed that the current political environment in Nepal is a major factor 
influencing implementation and enforcement of laws and rules.  The political transition 
through the Maoist insurgency has affected all aspects of bureaucracy and judicial 
decision making. For instance, some mentioned that frequent staff turnover in 
government agencies has led to great inefficiencies and has demoralized staff. 
Furthermore, government staff are frequently affiliated with a political party which can 
make it difficult to take action against some transgressions.  Some respondents said that 
political instability in the current system has encouraged corruption of judges, police and 
customs.  In addition, newspapers and a few respondents have mentioned that more than 
100 poachers were freed or given amnesty during the political transition period. In some 
cases, high level illegal wildlife traders were protected by political leaders.  
 
Many social factors were reported as a deterrent for effective protection of wildlife. 
Primarily, almost half of the respondents stated that poaching and illegal trade depends 
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on people’s criminal attitudes rather than on poverty and the lack of awareness. However 
about 50% of respondents did not rule out poverty and lower awareness of local people as 
a cause of current infractions of law. Furthermore, some believed that education of locals 
is an important social factor to ensure long term survival of animals and plants in the 
wild.  Some others reported that population growth in buffer zone villages, and 
unemployment within them, lead to more poaching.  Social problems such as rape and 
murder cases within national parks, and homelessness of children due to the jailing of 
parents have caused a deterioration in the relationship between locals and field level 
implementing agencies. Some respondents claimed that external factors such as growing 
markets in East and Southeast Asia, especially in China, have fueled poaching and illegal 
trade.  Wildlife products (rhino horn, tiger parts and red sandalwood) from Nepal and 
India are primarily transported to China for traditional medicine.  In addition, some 
mentioned that high economic value to wildlife poachers and huge economic returns for 
traders are reasons of unabated international illegal wildlife trade. Moreover, the 
geographic setting of Nepal (porous borders with India and China) was cited as a reason 
of growing illicit trade.  All respondents cited that organized crime is prevalent and it has 
encouraged poaching and illegal trade.  Organized crime was the fourth prioritized 
variable among all the issues mentioned by respondents.  Respondents suggested that 
there are three different tiers of people involved in illegal wildlife trade: local poor people 
as front line poachers and accomplices, middle men and high profile traders from urban 
areas.  They mentioned that most often local poachers and accomplices are caught and 
punished, but the majority of middle men and high profile traders avoid punishment. The 
majority reported that high profile traders have political and bureaucratic connections 
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such as with local leaders, judges, army, and police. In particular, some also claimed that 
some politicians, army and police were involved in red sandalwood trade.   
 
Figure 6: Frequency and number of the top five contextual issues 
 
 
IV. Discussion   
The statement that the lack of domestic enabling legislation is a primary cause of growing 
CITES violation in Nepal (Heinen and Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009) is 
partly correct. Numerous other complicating issues were observed that have also 
influenced CITES implementation processes in Nepal. Domestic legislation, however, is 
imperative because it includes specific goals and objectives and has clear and explicit 
methods required for effective policy implementation (Sabatier 1986). Respondents 
claimed that extant legislation can adequately address poaching and illegal trade provided 
that its implementation and enforcement is effective. My study clearly indicates that two 
laws, namely the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act and the 1993 Forest 
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Act primarily play critical roles in implementing CITES in Nepal.  Other Acts described 
above, however, are not less important to achieve CITES goals because they indirectly 
help to enforce it. For example, the 1955 Police Act provides authority to police officers 
to control all illegal activities, including illegal wildlife trade, within Nepal.  
 
The framework used for analysis is comprehensive as it has recognized top-down and 
bottom-up factors that affect policy implementation. Moreover, it is more flexible in its 
approach to analyze implementation.  All variables that were observed are categorized 
into five broad categories that interact with each other to explain implementation and 
enforcement gaps of the domestic regulatory policy.  In fact, these gaps suggest flaws in 
performance of the enforcement chain at various levels of government, and flaws in 
incentives based policies. 
 
Enforcement and monitoring of rules is critical when non-compliance thrives (Vogel and 
Kessler 1998). More importantly, the probability of detection and arrest, and the 
probability of punishment (prosecution and conviction) play important roles in 
implementation and enforcement of rules (Akella and Canno 2004; Leader-Williams and 
Milner-Gulland 1993), and eventually help to decrease the frequency of offences (Becker 
1968; Dobson and Lynes 2008). But the results suggest that the probability of detection 
of offenses and punishment if arrested is minimal through existing mechanisms. 
Respondents cited gaps in the content of the policies, lack of administrative capacity in 
the implementing agencies, negligible commitment of implementers and the influence of 
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the socio-economic and political context to explain the low probability of detection and 
punishment, and increasing violations of CITES.  
 
Anti-poaching efforts such as frequency and intensity of patrols and informant networks 
determine probability of detection (Hilborn et al. 2006). Many studies on elephant and 
rhino poaching in Africa have reported that frequency and efficiency of vehicle and foot 
patrols remarkably reduced poaching and illegal trade (Leader-Williams and Milner-
Gulland 1993; Hilborn et al. 2006). Further, Adhakari (2002) reported robust informant 
networks in Nepal have helped to reduce rhino poaching. Back then, the informant’s 
network was large with collaboration between DNPWC, DoF, local people and 
occasional armed support from Nepal Army, and the chain of command was clear.    
According to the 1973 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, army personnel 
and park staff are entrusted to protect wildlife in and around national parks. Likewise, the 
Department of Forests (DoF) has a role in protecting wildlife outside protected areas per 
the 1993 Forest Act. But current anti-poaching efforts, particularly patrols inside national 
parks, are sorely lacking, and informants’ networks outside national parks are now 
minimal (Poudyal et al. 2005; Bhuju et al. 2009). Mainly, the army and national park 
staff shirk patrolling, and existing security posts are inadequate (Baral and Heinen 2006; 
Bhuju et al. 2009). In addition, numerous other factors lower detection, such as the 
absence of clear specific rules and responsibilities and hierarchies of implementing 
agencies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier 1986) in extant legislation.  Najam 
(1995) argues that a clear chain of command is important when multi agency and 
multilayered working groups are involved, because specific roles and clear chains of 
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command delegate power to management agencies to provide clear directives to 
subordinate agencies, and also help to build support among agencies (Traffic North 
America 2009).  Many times enforcement agencies disregard conservation agencies 
because they lack political weight. Likewise, Heinen and Chapagain (2002) reported 
jurisdictional confusion between the DNPWC and the DoF because of lack of clarity in 
current law, which might lower the detection rate of violations (Akella and Canno 2004).  
Lower accountability or responsibility of staff also influences detection probability 
(Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993; Najam 1995). In Nepal, the lack of 
accountability of government staff was categorically claimed as a major deterrent to 
effective CITES implementation. Willingness to carry out the specified job is critical for 
effective implementation of legislation, and this, in fact, is minimal in the army. 
Protecting wildlife has never been a high priority of higher level Army staff.   According 
to the Resources Himalaya Watchdog newsletter, over 30 Nepal army soldiers are 
arrested every year for involvement in poaching or smuggling wildlife (Dangol and 
Paudyal 2008). More recently, the chief warden of Bardiya National Park claimed that 
out of 76 people arrested for poaching and illegal trade for bush meat, 50% were police 
and 25% were army personnel (Ghimire and Bhatta 2010).   Other than hindering the 
detection probability, a low commitment on the part of the Army and Police increases 
corruption and bribery, and reduces information sharing and coordinated efforts.  The low 
commitment of enforcement personnel may be because of lack of a performance 
appraisal system in current law. Likewise, limited staff and budget shortage in the army 
and the national park department might have influenced anti-poaching efforts in and 
around national parks. Many studies report that availability of adequate budgets for 
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monitoring in general increases species protection in protected areas (Hilborn et al. 2006; 
Walker 2009). Earlier studies in Nepal have also suggested that low staff numbers and 
lack of funding in enforcement agencies increases poaching and illegal trade (Heinen and 
Chapagain 2002; Aryal 2009; Bhuju et al. 2009).   
  
The probability of arrest of potential violators and offenders was meager, as suggested by 
low degrees of patrolling and minimal informant networks. Factors such as capacity and 
commitment of enforcement agencies and public support also play key roles. However 
the low arrest rate for illegal trade of red sandalwood was particularly related to lower 
commitments of enforcement agencies caused largely by corruption in management and 
enforcement personnel. Many national newspapers have reported incidents of 
involvement of traders, enforcement personnel (Army, Police, and Custom) and political 
leaders in illegal red sandalwood trade.   
 
Increased probability of punishment - that is prosecution and conviction - and subsequent 
reduction in offenses primarily depends on penalties inscribed in legislation (Keane et al. 
2008).  Although two existing laws have stringent punishment including fines and/or 
prison sentences, such provisions have had minimal impacts on restricting violations of 
CITES.  Results suggest several implementation gaps. The personal discretion of judges 
because of the open penalty provisions in law is a major issue that decreases the 
likelihood of punishment.  The open provision has prompted unfair judgments and high 
levels of corruption in the judicial system. Akella and Canno (2004) claim that unjust 
enforcement reduces compliance, engenders corruption and also demoralizes well 
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intentioned enforcement staff.  Furthermore, fixed penalties in the 1973 National Park 
and Wildlife Conservation Act have encouraged offences because benefits from illegal 
trade often exceed costs of offenses (Akella and Canno 2004). Working in Zambia, 
Milner-Gulland and Leaader-Williams (1992) reported that penalties that vary with the 
degree of violation are more effective.  In addition, a performance appraisal system is 
lacking or non functional in extant legislation, which might be a reason that has 
engendered high inconsistency in prosecution. Also, lack of legal knowledge among 
wardens and district forest officers may have the effect of reducing punishment because 
prosecution and conviction depend on backgrounds in the court proceedings.   
 
For instance, poacher data (April 2008-April 2009) from Chitwan National Park depicts 
the low probability of punishment.  According to the data, out of 87 total convicted 
offenders, especially in rhino and tiger cases, 35 % were not currently in custody. Earlier 
research also mentioned that nearly 60% of poachers escaped punishment (Bhuju et al. 
2009). In addition, many high profile illegal traders were less punished than local 
accomplices. For instance, the most infamous illegal trader “Yakche” got a short jail 
sentence even though he confessed and was convicted of involvement in more than 20 
rhino horns trade.  The jail term of a notorious middle man “Gokul Pant”, was reduced 
from an appellate court decision. Given the release of both the high profile trader and the 
middle man, and no dearth of locals willing to participate in poaching, and a favorable 
political environment, more killings of rhino and tiger are expected.     
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 In addition, enforcement of rules also depends on communication, coordination and 
cooperation between agency personnel, prosecutors, and judges (Akella and Canno 2004) 
and between NGOs.   In Nepal, information and intelligence sharing is too little and 
coordination meetings are too infrequent.  Heinen and Chapagain (2002) suggested that 
the frequency of coordination meetings between agencies should be inscribed into law for 
better enforcement results. In particular, communication, coordination and cooperation 
increase trust, which is important for maintaining efforts. More importantly, sharing of 
information decreases judicial confusion, increases procedural efficiency among 
agencies, and helps to build strong cases against offenders (Akella and Canno 2004).  As 
multi enforcement agency personnel are involved, communication and coordination are 
critical for effective implementation. Constant communication and concerted efforts 
between the international community, and a higher political priority for conservation 
could also help in enforcement by generating funding and capacity building.  Moreover, 
international meetings and MOUs exist among Nepal, India and China, but continuity of 
the activities is lacking which leads to lower trans-boundary cooperation.  
 
Although effective implementation of domestic policy depends on the political 
environment including public support, preference of politicians, and the role of NGOs 
(Vogel and Kessler 1998), influences of political environment  was not highly prioritized 
compared to enforcement issues by key informants.  However, considerable numbers of 
respondents mentioned the importance of the political environment to explain growing 
levels of illegal international trade and poaching.   Particularly, local awareness and 
educational opportunities, employment, and economic benefits to locals increases 
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favorable conservation attitudes required for effectiveness of community based 
conservation programs (Mehta and Heinen 2001) and can help to reduce poaching 
activates (Lewis et al. 1990). In addition, sound conservation attitudes are imperative to 
build public participation and coalitions for better conservation (Wells and Brandon 
1993). Specifically, participation and collective action increase communication and build 
trust to manage common benefits from wildlife resources and subsequently reinforce 
social capital (Pretty 2003).  Pretty and Smith (2004) argue that social capital components 
such as relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchange, common rule, norms and 
sanctions, and connectedness of groups are important to shape individual and group 
behaviors for positive biodiversity outcomes.  But the lack of above mentioned benefits 
that were reported during interviews infer poorer conservation attitudes of stakeholders, 
which may describe one cause of the increase in rhino poaching (Martin and Martin 
2006).  Moreover, current conservation policies in buffer zones of protected areas, which 
were heralded to bring more favorable conservation attitudes, are still top-down and such 
is represented by low social capital and lack of ownership among people. Unfavorable 
conservation attitudes that arise because of negligible benefits from community based 
conservation (Bookbinder et al. 1998; Wells and McShane 2004) may lower information 
and intelligence sharing about potential violators, and may reduce local participation in 
meetings and workshops or support in conservation initiatives. Vogel and Kessler (1998) 
mentioned that the lack of public support in India, Japan and Italy affected each 
government’s ability to comply with CITES.  
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Despite significant contributions of different national and international conservation 
organizations, respondents have cited some drawback in the working modality of 
organizations with regard to growing CITES implementation in Nepal.  Essentially, 
NGOs have a role to play in building public and political salience and support through 
advocacy and dissemination of information (Kraft and Vig 2009), generating funding for 
capacity development, supporting research, and functioning as watchdogs for 
conservation and protection of wildlife (Vogel and Kessler 1998). But undertaking of 
such roles by organizations is minimal in Nepal. Instead, conflict between NGOs, 
management agencies and enforcement agencies is prevalent. Good relationships between 
and within organizations and agencies are needed. The lack of concerted efforts and 
among NGOs and agencies has led to the decade long hold up of CITES bill (The 
(Endangered) Wildlife and Plant Trade Control Act, 2002.  Some NGOs have played a 
role in arresting poachers, but many key informants were concerned about that work 
because of minimal information sharing and lack of transparency.   
 
The major contextual issue that influences implementation of policy is the political 
situation of a country and preference of elected politicians (Vogel and Kessler 1998). In 
Nepal, according to the respondents, CITES implementation has been impacted by 
political instability of the country, lack of politicians’ priority of wildlife issues, low 
willingness of politicians to protect wildlife, political influence in bureaucratic and 
judicial decisions, and the changes in the political system.  Extreme political instability is 
prevalent in Nepal because of its recently ended civil war. The above situation suggests 
diminished enforcement of laws and regulations and reduced security decreased the 
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capacity of implementing agencies because of lack of resources, bad governance, and less 
support among target groups. Political instability and long transition periods particularly 
engenders weak judicial efficiency and political patronage that promotes corruption and 
non-compliance of rules and regulations (Damania et al. 2004).  In particular, Martin et 
al. (2009) opines that the massive rhino poaching after 2000 was because of political 
upheaval and disruption of law and order.  Enforcement of law and order in politically 
unstable conditions is disrupted because of shifting priorities of enforcement agencies.  
For instance, In Nepal, during the insurgency, national park army guards were reduced by 
70%, from 112 posts to 34 posts (Baral and Heinen 2006). In Chitwan National Park 
alone, 25 out of 32 army posts were withdrawn, which largely influenced park security 
leading to a large amount of rhinos poaching (Adhakari 2002).  
 
In states of war, there are many possibilities of non-compliance: forged permits, misuse 
of stolen permits and even genuine permit, which have been used to cover shipments of 
illegally acquired or traded specimens (Fuller et al. 2009). Furthermore, external 
resources in support of conservation decrease (funding, technical trainings, meetings) as 
many donors withdraw their activities for security reasons (Vogel and Kessler 1998, 
Hamilton et al. 2000). Political unrest also decreases the sources of income in the country 
because of reduced economic activities; such as decreases in tourism, lower agricultural 
productivity, and fewer development activities. Besides lack of monitoring and laxity in 
punishment, political instability encourages trans-boundary involvement of illegal traders 
as was evident in Nepal. Taking advantage of the situation, traders had used Nepal as a 
transit route for illegal wildlife trade with China and India (Yonzon 2005) and this still 
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exists. On top of that, the civil war affected trans-boundary efforts to curb illegal wildlife 
trade, as coordination, cooperation and communication between countries (Nepal, India 
and China) decreased (Oli 2005; Baral and Heinen 2006). 
 
The increase in CITES violations can also be predicted because of the high economic 
value and growing markets for wildlife products including parts of rhinos, tigers and red 
sandalwood. As the benefit is extremely high, organized gangs have used the porous 
borders to trade illegal wildlife products.  In particular, Ming et al. (2000) reported that 
about 10% of wild animal products used in Tibetan and Chinese tradition medicine come 
from Nepal and India, suggesting huge illegal trade in the region. Traffic (2007) 
published that Chinese consumption of protected species is increasing and further 
reported that Chinese medicinal trade in many part of the world is growing at an annual 
rate of 10 percent.  A survey in southern Chinese markets reveled that about half of the 
restaurants sold wild animal products.  Of 56 species for sale, 17 were protected under 
CITES (Traffic 2009). Surprisingly, consumers are diverse and Chinese traditional 
medicine is hugely profitable business in Asia, Europe and North America (Ming et al. 
2000; Traffic 2007). More importantly, the purchasing power of Chinese people is 
growing which bodes badly for important endangered wild animals, particularly tiger and 
rhinos.  Wild tiger poaching can be expected to continue and increase for two main 
reasons. First, Chinese people prefer wild tiger products over farmed tiger products 
because of supposedly better analgesic effects. Secondly, farming tiger is 250 times more 
expensive comparing to poaching in India and Nepal (Dinerstein et al. 2007).  In 
addition, poaching and illegal wildlife trade is expected to increase because people move 
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between borders with little limitation. The arrest of poachers of different nationalities in 
Kathmandu (90% of traders are from the Tibetan community) with large volumes of 
wildlife products, suggests that Nepal is both a transit and source of trade in wildlife 
products (Yonzon 2005).   
 
V. Conclusion 
My study shows that the CITES implementation process in Nepal, involving multiple 
actors at multiple levels, has been severely impacted by gaps in policy design, drawbacks 
in implementing agencies and contextual issues of implementation.  Numerous flaws that 
hinder implementation suggest problems in performance of the enforcement chain and 
low public and political support.  These conditions infer CITES violations, as indicated 
by illegal international trade of protected species, is large and growing.  
 
Primarily, the role of the army and national park staff in detecting illegal activities and 
arresting potential violators inside parks is negligible because of the lack of security 
which is prompted by a lack of responsibility, accountability and resources. Also, the role 
of police and customs in arresting offenders has been limited by little knowledge of 
wildlife products and the low priority of the issue. Moreover, punishment of high profile 
traders, if arrested, is low compared to front line poachers, which is at least partly a result 
of corruption. Lack of knowledge and priority among wardens, DFOs and Appellate and 
Supreme Court judges have also lowered the probability of punishment.  In addition, the 
lack of specific roles and responsibilities, a clear hierarchy and open punishment 
provisions have decreased the probability of detection and punishment.  The arrangement 
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needed to encourage communication, coordination and cooperation among stakeholders 
to improve enforcement is truly lacking. My study found that the probability of 
enforcement and monitoring of the enforcement of law is too little to curb existing rates 
of CITES violation.  Many redistributive polices such as community based conservation 
programs in buffer zones of national parks have been implemented to improve 
conservation attitudes to safeguard wildlife.  But socio economic benefits and social 
capital necessary to enhance favorable conservation attitudes and behavior is low. NGOs 
lag in building public and political salience and support. Advocacy and dissemination of 
information regarding illegal wildlife trade issues is inadequate.  In addition, political 
instability increases corruption and influences bureaucratic and judicial decision making.  
Many external factors such as high market prices and demand in East Asia and porous 
borders to smuggle illegal goods have also contributed the growth of illegal trade.  
Given the circumstances, any future policy that aims to address illegal wildlife trade 
should focus on increasing the performance of the enforcement chain. Essentially, policy 
should opt for strengthening each factor within the chain of enforcement including the 
probability of detection, arrest, persecution and conviction. At present, stringency of law 
is essential because of the presence of organized crime, porous borders, poor governance, 
and lack of adequate resources. However, prioritization among the factors needs further 
empirical study. In addition, policy should include a performance appraisal system for 
each implementing agency to improve commitment. The (MIST) integrated spatial 
management information system (Walston et al. 2010) that was mentioned during 
interviews could be beneficial to enhance the probability of detection, as it helps to 
monitor patrolling.  To increase the probability of arrest outside protected areas, the role 
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of police and customs should be encouraged with adequate training programs.  The role 
of customs especially is important in management and enforcement of CITES because of 
the large numbers of field level staff throughout the country. Also, community based 
informant networks need to be encouraged for better information and intelligence 
sharing. Although prevailing laws have provisions to reduce poaching and illegal wildlife 
trade, the system lacks clear responsibilities, chains of command, and performance 
appraisals. Therefore, these issues should be inscribed into new legislation or amended in 
existing legislation.     
 
Non-governmental organizations play important roles in the public and political domain 
to help build consensus, salience and support of issues through information sharing and 
advocacy. Such organizations also help to build new knowledge by funding and 
functioning as watchdogs in support of conservation. Therefore, the role of NGOs should 
be promoted.  In addition, as people’s perception of illegal wildlife trade depends on how 
media frame the problem, the role of media needs to be enhanced.  More importantly, as 
places near protected areas have many poor and illiterate people who can be lured into 
illicit activities, socio economic development, awareness and education programs are 
essential to build positive conservation attitudes and behavior. Finally, as many policy 
implementation gaps mentioned above suggest the intricate problems associated with 
wildlife governance, further empirical study is needed.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 7: Protected Animals under NPWC Act, 1973 
Mammals 
 
S.N 
SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1. Macaca assamensis Assamese monkey Assamis rato bandar 
2. Manis pentadactyla Indian pangolin Salak 
3. Caprolagus hispidus Hispid hare Hispid kharayo 
4. Canis lupus Wolf Bwanso 
5. Ursus arctos Himalayan Bear Himali rato bhalu 
6. Ailurus fulgens Red panda Habre 
7. Prionodon pardicolor Spotted linsang Silu 
8. Felis bengalensia Leopard cat Chari bagh 
9. Felis lynx Lynx Lynx 
10. Neofelis nebulosa Clouded leopard Dwanse chituwa 
11. Panthera tigris Tiger Bagh 
12. Panthere uncia Snow leopard Hinu chituwa 
13. Elephas maximus Asiatic elephant Hatti 
14. Rhiniceros unicornis Rhinoceros Gainda 
15. Sus salvanius Pygmi hog Pudke Bandel 
16. Moschus moschiferos Musk deer Kasturi mirga 
17. Cervus duvauceli Swamp deer Barhasingha 
18. Bos gaurus Gaur Gauri gai 
19. Bos grunniens Wild yak Yak 
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20. Bubalus bubalis Wild buffalo Arna 
21. Ovis ammon Great tibetan sheep Nayan 
22. Pantholops hodgsoni Tibetan antilope Chiru 
23. Antilope cervicapra Black buck Krisnasar 
24. Tetraceros quadricornis Four horned antilope Chauka 
25. Hyaena hyaena Striped hynae Hundar 
26. Platanista gangetica Gangetic dolphin Shons 
 
Birds 
S.N SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1. Catreus wallichii Chir pheasant Kalij 
2. Lophophorus impeyanus Impeyan pheasant Danfe 
3. Tragopan satyra Crimson horned pheasant Monal 
4. Ciconia ciconia White stork Seto sarus 
5. Eupodotis bengalensis Bengal florican Khar majur 
6. Sypheotides indica Lesser florican Sano khar majur 
7. Grus grus Sarus crane Sarus 
8. Buceros bicornis Giant hornbill Thulo dhanesh 
9. Ciconia nigra Black stork Kalo sarus 
 
Reptiles 
S.N SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1. Gavialis gangeticus Ghariyal Gharial gohi 
2. Python spp. Python Ajingar 
61 
 
3. Varanus flavescens Monitor lizard Sun gohoro 
 
Appendix 8:  Plants banned under Forest Act, 1993 and Forest Regulation, 1995  
 Plants banned for collection, use, sale and distribution, transport and export 
SN SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1 Dactylorhiza hatagirea  Panchaule, Hattajadi, 
Salampanja 
2 Juglans regia Walnut (bark) Okhar bokra 
 
Plants banned for export except processed with permission of Department of Forest 
SN SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
    
1 Abies spectabilis Himalayan fir, Silver fir Gobresalla, Talispatra, 
Thingresalla 
2 Cinnamomum glaucescens  Sugandhakokila, Malagedi 
3 Cordyceps sinensis Caterpillar fungus Yarchagumba, Jeevanbuti 
4 Nardostachys grandiflora Spikenard Jatamansi, Bhulte, Balchhar 
5 Parmelia nepalensis Lichen Jhyau 
6 Rauvolfia serpentina Indian snake root Sarpagandha 
7 Rock exudate Rock exudates Silajit 
8 Taxus baccata Himalayan yew Lauth salla, Talispatra 
9 Valeriana jatamansii Himalayan valerian Sugandhabal, Tagar 
 
Trees banned for transport, export and felling for commercial purpose 
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SN SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1 Acacia catechu Cutch tree Khayar 
2 Bombax ceiba Silk Cotton tree Simal 
3 Dalbergia latifolia Rose Wood Satisal 
4 Juglans regia Walnut Okhar 
5 Michelia champaca Orange champaca  Champ 
6 Pterocarpus marsupium Indian Kino Tree Bijayasaal 
7 Shorea robusta Sal Sal 
 
Plant banned for export except recommendation of Department of Plant Resource as the valid 
species and availability of the species by DoF 
SN SCIENTIFIC NAME ENGLISH NAME LOCAL NAME 
1 Neopicrorhiza scrophulariiflora Picrorhiza Katuki, Kutaki 
 
 
